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Abstract
Planning for the future is a necessary activity which spans across all aspects of an individual’s
life. Concurrent cognitive load has been shown to hinder future planning, whereas concrete
construal of events has been shown to increase planning efficacy. Interestingly, a limited
literature speaks towards cognitive load inducing concrete construal. However, the two
constructs predict differing outcomes on future planning therefore the interaction of cognitive
load inducing a concrete construal is particularly interesting. The research study tested whether
differing levels of concurrent cognitive load increase or decrease planning efficacy. The
intention of the research was to elucidate whether cognitive load or construal is a greater
predictor of planning as this will fill a gap in the literature. 693 participants were sampled and
revealed significant main effects of cognitive load and task type on planning steps generated and
enthusiasm. The predicted interactions between cognitive load and task type were not observed.
Conclusions from the results are that cognitive load negatively impacts planning behavior and
the results of this study did not confirm the induction of concrete construal under cognitive load.
Keywords: cognitive load, construal level, working memory, future planning, executive
function
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Concurrent load and construal on planning
Cognitive load, often conceptualized as the utilization of executive resources, has been
studied and implicated in its impacts on cognitive functioning. Most of this research has found
detrimental or otherwise hindering effects of cognitive load on cognitive function. One area
where the cognitive load literature is lacking is in understanding how these cognitive load effects
present themselves or interact with behavior and cognition in a naturalistic (outside of the lab)
setting. My conducted research focuses on furthering our understanding of how cognitive load
impacts ubiquitous real-world activities - that every person engages in - but it also seeks to
determine situations where cognitive load can lead to beneficial outcomes for individuals. I
looked at future planning, as this is something that we all do both professionally and otherwise.
For example, people may need to plan for a complex work project such as coordinating a new
payroll system rollout across the company or a vacation in an exotic location. Both examples of
future planning, from implementing a new payroll system to planning for a vacation require a
multitude of future steps to be generated and executed. Furthermore, future planning can be a
cognitively taxing process that requires the utilization of the same cognitive resources that make
up cognitive load as a construct. Whereas the literature supports a general hinderance of
cognitive ability as a function of cognitive load, I argue for and conducted a study that suggests
that these hinderances of cognitive functioning can be adaptive and helpful in certain contexts.
The present research study investigated how cognitive load maps onto the effects
predicted by construal level theory. Construal level has been shown to have impacts on cognitive
functioning, including, but not limited to, future planning. To what extent does cognitive load
mirror the effects of construal level, and to what extent do the two constructs differ? These
research questions have not been thoroughly explored, and investigating them will further the
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understanding of how human cognitive functioning operates. The present study manipulated
cognitive load via working memory, an often utilized and heavily implicated executive function
in a wide variety of situations (Brunye et al., 2018; Klaus et al., 2017; Miyake et al., 2000). The
impacts of cognitive load on planning will elucidate the relationship between construal level
theory and cognitive load. If the observed results mirror those expected by construal level theory
then this will suggest that the two constructs either heavily overlap or that perhaps cognitive load
induces distal or proximal construal. While cognitive load has been shown to induce concrete
construal, the specific predictions regarding planning differ slightly between the two constructs
(Block et al., 2010; Ferrari, 2001; Hadar et al., 2019; Huijser et al., 2020; Koerner & Volk,
2014).
The primary focus of this study is to determine how concurrent working memory load
impacts one’s future planning capabilities. Cognitive load literature suggests that increasing
amounts of concurrent cognitive load decrease judgements of prospective duration (perceived
shorter amount of time to complete the task) and decrease the amount of preparation that one can
perform, resulting in overall poorer planning or task performance (Block et al, 2010). Construal
level theory also predicts future planning such that proximal construal induces concrete
cognition, which leads to greater specificity (steps planned and generated) but also greater selfcontrol failure on the task (Schmeichel et al., 2010). Distal construal induces abstract cognition
that leads to lower specificity but greater self-control success on the task. The area where these
two theories overlap, and the primary focus on this research proposal, is that further research has
shown that moderate cognitive load appears to induce concrete construal that may increase
effectiveness on a planning task (Hadar et al., 2019; Huijser et al., 2020; Kliegel et al., 2000;
Strickland et al., 2019). The research findings therefore conflict: cognitive load literature
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suggests that, under cognitive load, fewer steps should be generated, but under cognitive load
construal level theory suggests that more steps should generated. These overlapping but
contradictory findings speak to the complex nature of cognitive load and its profound impacts on
all manner of cognitive functioning.
Before methodology can be discussed, I believe it is important to discuss a sufficient
background of the literature, which will serve as a framework for understanding cognitive load
as a construct, the ways in that it can be measured or manipulated, and broadly the impacts that
have been observed on a variety of behavioral and cognitive outcomes. Furthermore, a brief
overview of the previous findings of cognitive load on planning will provide a knowledge base
for understanding the present research. Lastly, understanding the effects of both construal level
and perception of time are imperative towards setting the framework for the present study.
Overview of Key Literature
Cognitive Load
Cognitive load broadly describes the exertion of cognitive functioning such that ability to
perform other tasks that require the same resource base are hindered. Most activities that we
perform such as holding a conversation, driving a car, or completing simple arithmetic problems
draw upon the cognitive resources that are implicated in cognitive load. Similar to a physical
muscle group, like your bicep, utilizing the executive function muscle via cognitive load uses up
some or all its potential output. . However, how cognitive load is operationalized, measured, and
broken down is complex.
One of the earliest and most seminal theories that aimed to describe our cognitive
capacity is Baddeley’s working memory model (Baddeley, 1983). Baddeley’s model posits that
we have a limited resource base with that to perform cognitive tasks such as: arithmetic,
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manipulating objects spatially, and maintaining information in the forefront of our mind
(Baddeley, 1983). Working memory theory builds upon previous memory research. A distinction
between short term and long-term memory does not properly encapsulate all the functions that
our short-term storage fulfills, namely findings that show that we actively manipulate
information in the short term. Working memory accounts for more of the variance observed in
our cognitive functioning relative to only short-term memory. The active manipulation of
information is integral to human functioning and is the basis of Baddeley’s working memory
theory.
The theory is broken down into three major components: central executive, visuospatial
sketchpad, and phonological loop. Working memory and by proxy cognitive resources are not a
monolith; tasks recruit differential cognitive systems that govern specific cognitive functions.
One could compare working memory to an internal combustion engine. Engines convert a fuel
source into output, but this output is diverse, including horsepower and torque. These two
measurements of engine output are relevant to converting energy into motion, much the same as
Baddeley’s working memory components are differing outputs of effortful cognition. The
visuospatial sketchpad is responsible for the monitoring and manipulation of visual and spatial
information, whereas the phonological loop is responsible for auditory information (including
language as a whole). Baddeley later included a third component responsible for the active
maintenance and governance of these two “slave” systems, this component being called the
central executive (Baddeley, 2000).
The differing working memory systems have a fair amount of overlap with one another
while still having distinct function and unique variance. When tasks demand a specific type of
information to be manipulated, like spatial tasks or auditory language, it becomes harder to

5
attend to information that similarly loads onto the slave system responsible for that functioning.
A task that recruits the other slave system is comparatively less affected (Baddeley, 1983).
Concretely, it is easier to perform a spatial task alongside a language task than it is to perform
two language tasks concurrently. There is spill-over between the visuospatial sketchpad and the
phonological loop (Baddeley, 1983). Spillover, or the functioning of one system impacting the
other, suggests that there is an overall working memory storage space to pull from. However,
there is a segmentation of these resources such that it would be easier for someone to complete
concurrent tasks that recruit the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop respectively, as
opposed to tasks that simultaneously recruit only one of the slave systems.
Building upon working memory as an early construct with that to measure cognitive load,
cognitive load has been further conceptualized as the utilization of executive functioning.
Executive function describes the processes of mental set shifting, updating (working memory),
and inhibition of response (Miyake et al., 2000). Set shifting is the ability to switch between
differing rule sets or distinct processes relevant to completing a task. Updating is the ability to
hold finite quantities of information in a readily available state with the intention of manipulating
or recalling the information. Updating most closely resembles Baddeley’s working memory
model and is the primary focus of this paper. The ability to manipulate and maintain information
in our cognition is a ubiquitous and important process. Lastly, inhibition is staying on task by
diverting cognitive resources to blocking out distracting or off-task stimuli. Executive functions
are said to exert control over cognitive processes and describe the ability to regulate complex
mental processes and behaviors (Miyake et al., 2000).
There is significant overlap between all differing executive functions, but they each have
unique variance associated with them. Research shows that there are measures and manipulations
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of executive function that best map onto specific executive functions (Miyake et al., 2000). In
other words, executive functioning is a complex process that can be both measured and
manipulated in a variety of ways.
Turning back to the earlier research on working memory, occupying working memory is
often used to induce concurrent load. Working memory is frequently utilized when concurrent
load is manipulated because many basic and complex tasks require working memory in some
capacity; furthermore, working memory load is easily induced via a variety of differing tasks
spanning multiple modalities (Benedek & Fink, 2019; Miyake & Friedman, 2012, Miyake et al.,
2000). For these reasons, I plan to use a working memory manipulation in my study to induce
and explore the downstream impacts of concurrent cognitive load.
Cognitive Load Measures and Manipulations
Cognitive load can be measured and manipulated in a variety of ways. Studies have
specifically analyzed that executive functions map onto that measures and/or manipulations of
cognitive load (Miyake et al., 2000).
One of the most straightforward ways in that cognitive load can be induced is via
concurrent working memory tasks. N-back tasks operate such that a person is asked to remember
a digit or item that is back N times; therefore, you can manipulate the difficulty of the task by the
size of the N. The more items that someone is asked to remember, the greater the load on
working memory by forcing more information to be held in a readily available state in working
memory. N-back tasks are heavily used because they can use items that differ in modality (e.g.,
auditory, or visual stimulus) as well as content (e.g., numbers, shapes, letters)( Miyake &
Friedman, 2012, Miyake et al., 2000). The active maintenance of information is a necessary
process in all manner of human functions, from simple to complex. While N-back tasks are
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frequently utilized way to induce working memory load, there are a variety of other methods in
that to induce or measure working memory.
Working memory has been further assessed via operation and reading span tasks. In both
tasks, participants are asked to remember a string of letters or other such stimuli, while
intermittently having to complete math problems (OSPAN) or determine if sentences make sense
(RSPAN) (Dokic et al., 2018). Both span tasks measure updating or working memory in that
they require the active maintenance and repeated rehearsal of information. The information to be
remembered at the end of the task is competing with distracting tasks that also utilize cognitive
resources. Span tasks are often used to determine an individual’s working memory capacity
because they map onto the complex nature of utilizing our working memory in real-world
situations well. In day-to-day life, a person often finds themselves in situations where they need
to remember a string of information (e.g., grocery list, new phone number, tasks to be
completed) while also completing other tasks that might compete with some of our cognitive
resources. This is essentially the same form that the span tasks take, but in a less controlled
manner than within the lab.
Other measures of cognitive load instead focus on the inhibition component of executive
function. Perhaps one of the most well-known examples of this type of measure is the Stroop
task. In a classic Stroop task, participants are tasked with responding with what color a word is
written as, but the words are written in varying colors that may differ from the physical color of
the word. The rationale is that it is difficult for someone to say the word “red” when that word is
displayed in blue. Good performance on this task therefore requires the inhibition of a
predominant response or tendency of ours to want to respond to the color of the word and not the
meaning of the word. Being able to inhibit responses or thoughts is an important component of
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executive functioning. For example, people might need to inhibit off-task thoughts when they are
at work, and a test like the Stroop looks to measure how effective people are at this inhibition
function.
Inhibition can be further tested via anti-saccade or go/no go tasks. Each task requires the
inhibition of response, but the type of response to be inhibited differs by task. Anti-saccade tasks
ask participants to fixate on a point. This point, normally in the center of the screen, will then
have an object flash on a different portion of the screen. The natural human reaction to the
sudden appearance of a new stimulus to direct gaze to the new stimulus. Instead, participants are
instructed to shift their gaze away from the unexpected stimulus, therefore overriding their
predominant and automatic response. The overriding of an automatic saccade, or eye-movement,
requires inhibition. Go/no go tasks on the other hand ask participants to respond or “go” to a
specific stimulus or stimuli and not to “go” (i.e., do not respond) to another stimulus or stimuli.
The behavioral action measured is normally a button press. As has been the case with the
previous examples, go/no go tasks require a participant to override a potentially automatic desire
to “go” or press the button. Participants are judged on the amount of errors they commit and the
speed with that they respond to the differing stimuli. On average, the expectation is that
participants will respond slower on the “no go” trials that represents the cognitive mechanism of
inhibition at work. Whereas both inhibition and updating are relatively straightforward executive
functions to measure or manipulate, switching is significantly more difficult and complex.
An example of a popular measure that is said to test the task switching component of
executive function is the Tower of Hanoi. The Tower of Hanoi is a rule-based logic game where
one must move a series of sequentially sized rings from one peg all the way to a peg on the other
side. A few rules constrain the moves you can make during this task; namely, rings can only ever
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sit on top of a ring that is larger. The Tower of Hanoi is suggested to test the switching
component of executive function because a person needs to switch between differing strategies
and cognitions throughout the process of coming to the correct solution. The Tower of Hanoi,
and information processing approach, stress the importance of sometimes having to move away
from an eventual solution out of necessity. Therefore, one must alternate between differing
strategies, which might be counterintuitive, to reach the final solution. Switching as a construct is
one of the more difficult executive function processes to measure. The complexity of tasks used
to measure task switching therefore reflect this complexity. Each of the components of executive
function can be used to either measure or manipulate cognitive load. Depending on the specifics
of a research study, one might lean towards a component of executive function that best
encapsulates a particular type of cognitive functioning utilized in a study.
Regarding the present study, I will utilize an updating cognitive load task that presents
participants with pairs of exemplars to be remembered. These exemplars will be constantly
updated and presented to participants. Participants will need to remember the most recent
exemplar from a finite number of categories that were presented to them at the start. Participants
will be given all possible categories and exemplars at the beginning of the study, and then will be
later asked to remember the most recent exemplar presented. The purpose of this form of
working memory manipulation is that prior knowledge or experience should have less of an
impact on performance. With some of the aforementioned tasks, like operation span tasks,
individual differences in arithmetic ability might have a profound impact on how difficult the
task is and subsequently how well participants do on it. These subject related variables, along
with others, that might impact cognitive load performance are the reason why I chose the
updating task that I did.
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For the purposes of this project, working memory and updating will be manipulated via a
concurrent updating task. In part because this aspect of executive function is easy to manipulate,
but furthermore because updating is integral in tasks and behaviors ranging from simple to
complex. To build upon the ease of manipulation, updating is also easily taxed in everyday life.
For these reasons, among others, updating will be manipulated and its effects on future planning
will be tested.
Cognitive Load Effects
Having laid the groundwork with a variety of different ways in that cognitive load can be
manipulated and tested, I will now delve into some of the downstream impacts of cognitive load
on behavior and cognition. Cognitive load has impacts on all manner of activities, behaviors, and
cognitions, because executive function is required for all tasks, from basic to complex. I will
detail a variety of situations and activities that are significantly impacted by cognitive load. One
area that is not sufficiently tested, however, is how cognitive load impacts future planning, and
the few findings on the subject appear to be at odds with another significant body of literature in
construal level theory. For those reasons, the impacts of cognitive load on future planning are the
primary focus of this paper, but understanding the overall literature and the broad range of
effects of cognitive load serve as a necessary background for this project.
Cognitive load research illustrates the importance of cognitive resources, such as working
memory, in the consolidation of short-term memories (Vlassova & Pearson, 2013). In a randomdot-motion paradigm that measures decision making by presenting moving stimulus dots that the
participant must indicate that direction of coherent motion, memory consolidation was shown to
be hindered by concurrent working memory load (Vlassova & Pearson, 2013). When given a
blank screen between stimulus onset and the response window, participants increased their
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accuracy relative to a masked delay screen. When cognitive load was induced via a high load
concurrent digit span (10-number string), the effect was not present. Working memory load
therefore seems to govern our ability to consolidate short term memories. The authors describe
this research study as a proof of decision-relevant information in short term memory impacting
decision accuracy on the dot-motion probe after delay (Vlassova & Pearson, 2013). Therefore,
the authors support the idea that quicker processing that may be impacted by cognitive load has
impacts on downstream decision-making processes. For a real-world example, concurrent
cognitive load during a random-dot-motion paradigm may be analogous to attempting to
consolidate a phone number to memory while having to hold a conversation with someone over
the phone.
Cognitive load impacts assessment of risk (Allen et al., 2014; Deck, Jahedi, & Sheremeta,
2015; Harris et al., 2020; Whitney, Rinehart, & Hinson, 2008). In general, cognitive load
increases conservative decision making. The actual mechanism of how decision making becomes
more conservative under cognitive load is a complex discussion point. Conservative decision
making is in part a product of concurrent cognitive load truncating the total amount of cognitive
resources available to rigorously evaluate strategies and decisions that can be made in a
particular situation. As such, when concurrent cognitive load is present, an individual is
significantly more likely to settle with an initial decision and/or a strategy that has proven to
work in the past. Even if this strategy is not optimal, such that a better strategy could be
implemented, participants have been found to stick with the previous response. Cognitive load
therefore generally impacts decision making capabilities when it comes to evaluating risk and
formulating responses to that risk. These effects on risk evaluation show how concurrent
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cognitive load can not only hinder basic processes but also complex processes, such as choosing
between a multitude of differing strategies or solutions to a problem.
Cognitive load slows down processing that can have profound impacts on complex and
important activities that many people do on a day-to-day basis, such as driving (Flores, 2017;
Wolfe et al., 2019). Cognitive load, manipulated concurrently via auditory and visual working
memory load, slows down reaction times to typical driving responses (Flores, 2017); Wolfe et
al., 2019). Typical driving responses include, but are not limited to, responding to brake lights
and reacting to a driver merging into your lane. Higher concurrent working memory load
increases the time that it takes to respond to brake lights and increases the proportion of brake
lights missed entirely (Wolfe et al., 2019). Concurrent cognitive load causing significant
detriments in reacting to hazards on the road like brake lights ahead of you demonstrates the far
reaching and ecologically relevant impacts of cognitive load on functioning.
Driving is a complex task that requires attention to differing stimuli with significant
consequences when the necessary attention and response is not exhibited. Research into visual
working memory has shown that having to fixate on a visual stimulus and maintain it in working
memory concurrently hinders functioning towards relevant stimuli, representing a bottleneck of
working memory capacity. Visual information presented to drivers is presented rapidly and
therefore requires a significant amount of attention to maintain proper vigilance. When a task
like driving is therefore done concurrently with other tasks that also simultaneously recruit
working memory resources, like receiving driving directions, the total amount of concurrent
working memory load negatively impacts driving performance via reaction times and lane
adherence (Hollands et al., 2019). Research into an ecologically valid behavior like driving is
important because how people react to hazards on the road is necessary and potentially damaging
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to the driver and others. Concurrent cognitive load has therefore been shown to significantly
impact driving performance in a multitude of studies, demonstrating the necessity for
understanding how cognitive load interacts with complex everyday cognitive functioning. Many
behaviors and cognitions, from simple to complex, recruit working memory resources.
Cognitive load impacts judgments of duration and stereotype activation (Block, Hancock,
& Zakay, 2010; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Duration and stereotype judgments are both impacted
by cognitive load and demonstrate how much cognitive load impacts a wide variety of
functioning. Furthermore, cognitive load impacting duration judgements is directly relevant to
discussing planning, as proper planning is contingent on assessing the amount of time or duration
that a task has or will take.
Judgments of duration are an applied way to measure cognitive load, as cognitive load
has a direct impact on duration judgments (Block et al., 2010). Duration judgements are the
amount of time that a person perceives a task will take or has taken. Judgments of prospective
duration are shorter under concurrent cognitive load and judgments of retrospective duration are
longer (Block et al., 2010). Loading working memory capacity via a variety of processing tasks
that varied in difficulty, as well as tasks that placed demands on the attentional system, were both
shown to impact duration judgments (Block et al., 2010). Anecdotally, we have all experienced
this phenomenon. When under considerable cognitive load while completing a difficult activity,
we tend judge that time as having passed by quickly. These findings further show the relative
complexity of cognitive load and its effects. Entering a flow like state where time seems to pass
more quickly under considerable cognitive load has aided a wide variety of people. Cognitive
load therefore clearly has far reaching effects on our cognitions and the decisions that come as an
outcome. For example, someone might delay getting started on an assignment only to complete it
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in one night because they know that, when under cognitive load, they will not only be able to get
the assignment done, but it will temporally “fly by.” A simple judgment of duration, and the
expectancy that it will occur under cognitive load, impacts a decision that a person makes.
Further evidence about the impacts of cognitive load shows changes in perceptions and
eventual application of stereotypes (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Stereotype activation is inhibited by
concurrent working memory load (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). During concurrent working memory
load (e.g., a digit span task), a person may therefore not make immediate stereotypic judgments
that could change their behavior towards another individual. Interestingly, if a stereotype was
first activated, and then cognitive load was induced via a visual search paradigm in that
participants had to remember what letters were presented and respond accordingly, the
participant was more likely to apply the stereotype under that concurrent load (Gilbert & Hixon,
1991). Cognitive load therefore appears to hinder the application of a stereotype but increase the
likelihood of its usage if already activated. These findings have interesting conclusions that can
be derived. First and foremost, the application and activation of stereotypes seem to draw upon
the same cognitive resources as the cognitive load measures recruited. Furthermore, the
application of these findings speaks towards a complicated relationship between cognitive load
and stereotype activation. For example, if a police officer inherently holds stereotypic
judgements, then under cognitive load they will be more likely to apply them. If instead that
police officer does not explicitly hold these judgments, they may instead be less likely to apply
them because they were never activated under high cognitive load.
Cognitive resources are clearly implicated in a wide variety of functioning, from complex
decision making to more implicit judgements. The far-reaching impacts of cognitive load

15
therefore speak to the necessity of properly understanding how concurrent cognitive load impacts
other processes that apply to a wide variety of people in many contexts, such as future planning.
Cognitive Load on Planning
Cognitive load changes strategies that people employ when planning. Cognitive load has
been shown to impact a variety of complex behaviors, not the least of that is the ability to plan.
Planning for the future requires the recruitment of cognitive resources as planning requires
someone to consider differing possibilities, what needs to be completed, and how to best
approach that upcoming event. A common way that planning is conceptualized in the literature is
the number of steps that a person generates that need to be completed towards eventual goal
completion. The rationale behind this is that the more steps that are generated, the greater
success that one will have on the task, with more steps being a metric of greater preparation.
People are generally quite poor at effectively planning (Forsyth & Burt, 2008; FrancisSmythe & Robertson, 1999; Wiese et al., 2016). When participants were asked to allocate time
towards a necessary task and then asked to allocate time towards specific singular tasks that
make up the aforementioned task, researchers found that when these individual tasks are summed
together they are significantly longer than a prediction of the task as a whole (Forsyth & Burt,
2008). Participants in this study therefore show that people are generally bad at allocating the
necessary time towards a task and in particular accounting for all the various steps that are
necessary to properly complete a task. Judging the amount of time that a task or series of tasks
take is paramount to planning and completing the task. The general finding that people are poor
at judging task duration and that this is exacerbated under cognitive load is a significant finding
worthy of further research (Block et al., 2010).
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Research into the effects of cognitive load on planning is sparse, but findings suggest that
planning is generally poorer under concurrent cognitive load with fewer to-be-completed items
being completed (Ferrari, 2001). These findings specifically pertain to chronic procrastinators
where the greatest detrimental effects of cognitive load are observed with chronic procrastinators
being significantly worse at completing tasks under concurrent cognitive load relative to nonprocrastinators. Individual differences in motivation or execution of plans, as referenced via
findings on chronic procrastinators, shows impacts of cognitive load and suggest that cognitive
load does have an impact on planning (Ferrari, 2001).
Working memory load has been implicated in concrete planning relative to abstract
planning (Klaus et al., 2016). Research demonstrated that advance planning at the phonological
level (concrete) is hindered by concurrent working memory load whereas advance planning at
the abstract level is not hindered (Klaus et al., 2016). Advance planning at the phonological level
was tested by using phonologically related distractor words whereas advance planning at the
abstract level was tested via semantically related distractor words. Performance on the task was
uniformly impacted with abstract distractors compared to performance being significantly worse
under cognitive load when the distractor words were phonologically related (Klaus et al., 2016).
Results that show that specifically working memory, more so than other executive function
components, impacts planning; this is relevant to the questions of this paper. Under what
circumstances does concurrent working memory load increase planning efficacy through the
mechanism of concrete construal and how this is contrasted by limited findings that suggest that
working memory load hinders concrete or proximal planning efficacy must be investigated.
Research findings that differ in their predictions on planning efficacy depend on whether the
researchers were more interested in cognitive load or construal as a predictor. For example,
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previous work suggests that working load hinders planning, which is at odds with the construal
literature that finds concrete construal induced via working memory load increases planning
efficacy (Huijser et al., 2020). The findings of construal level theory on planning will be
discussed as they pertain to the direct question that the proposed research is attempting to
answer.
Working memory resources have been shown to impact concurrent planning for future
events (Huijser et al., 2020). Planning for a future event while also completing a current task
occurs all throughout our daily life, such as discussing with your office when to schedule a
meeting while also working on a spreadsheet. The ability to plan for a future event while
performing a concurrent and cognitively taxing task is hindered as a product of how much our
working memory capacity is utilized by the concurrent task (Huijser et al., 2020). Participants
were asked to complete a task that varied in working memory utilization while also being able to
look across the screen and prepare for the next task they will be asked to complete. Eye tracking
data shows that participants reliably engaged with the second or future task, which acted as
evidence that they were planning. Working memory is necessary for future planning and when
working memory is utilized by the concurrent working memory tasks participants were
significantly less likely to plan ahead and were worse at planning (Huijser et al., 2020).
A key outcome of planning is succeeding on the task and performing the steps that one
has generated. Often, success on a given planning task is conceptualized as self-control failure or
success, where self-control is the ability for one to sustain action towards the task and follow
through with all the planning that they generated. This is an important application of the planning
literature because planning for a task is somewhat irrelevant if it does not result in appreciable
impacts on the task being completed. Construal level theory speaks to key differences in self-
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control failure or success as a function of construal type. As aforementioned, although the
literature speaking towards the effects of cognitive load on planning is sparse, there is a much
more robust literature regarding construal level and planning. The differing predictions on
planning outcomes between the two theories will be tested. Before these differing predictions can
be tested, and for the purposes of this paper, it is worth discussing some of the general findings
of construal level theory that form the basis for the claims I am positing.
Construal Level Theory
Construal level theory discusses the differing ways in that a person can conceptualize
events or concepts, primarily relating to the psychological distance (distal/abstract &
proximal/concrete) (Trope & Liberman, 1998; 2000; 2010). Differing construal have an impact
on the output of cognition and how an event is approached. An often-used example is that when
one is far away (distal) they will view the forest and as they get closer (proximal) they will
observe the trees, demonstrating the relative impact of real and/or imagined distance on our
perception as well as our cognition. The farther away an event is the more abstract it is
perceived, with a person focusing on the higher order (meta-level) aspects whereas as an event
becomes closer either temporally or psychologically it is viewed as much more concretely or
focusing on the specifics (micro-level) (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Specifically for this proposed
research I will be talking about how construal impacts one’s ability to plan for events in the
future, but construal level theory is a far reaching and heavily researched topic in social
psychology.
Construal level highlights the aspects of a stimulus, event, or thought that most
intrinsically associated with the event, with those aspects which are most intrinsically associated
with the event being more salient distally (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Importantly, for the
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proposed research I believe that this means that a distal (abstract) view of vacation planning will
focus on the positive experience of being on vacation whereas the distal view of work planning
will focus on the task which needs to be completed. I conceptualize the core tenet of a vacation
to be the fun we have while on it and the core tenet of a work task to be the necessity of
completing it. Furthermore, when an event becomes more proximal the low-level aspects become
more salient (Trope & Liberman, 2010). The low-level aspects of vacation planning are the
details of what needs to be done, details which are not inherently positive.
Regarding the proposed research, construal level theory has been implicated in the
qualities of a future event that a person finds relevant (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope &
Liberman, 2010). Distal future events are judged on their desirability relative to their feasibility
and the effect flips for proximal events (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Viewing a future event based
on desirability relative to feasibility will necessarily increase the positive valence of that future
event. Whereas viewing an event more proximally will highlight the negative valence (Liberman
& Trope, 1998). The proposed research seeks to validate these findings through the measurement
of enthusiasm as an outcome variable regarding planning for a work task or a vacation. Planning
for a future vacation should lead to significantly more enthusiasm towards the task, particularly
because with the vacation being perceived as temporally far away this will further predispose an
individual to focus on the abstract thoughts of how fun the vacation will be relative to the
concrete thoughts of how to plan for the vacation. Furthermore, the perceived emotionality of an
event is more likely to be positive distally relative to proximally (Van Boven, et al., 2010).
Whereas these effects are expected on average, the proposed study will test whether cognitive
load pushes these findings around. In particular, the proposed study will seek to wash out the
positive valence associated with distal vacation planning by inducing a concrete construal
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therefore increasing the salience of the more negative planning aspects of the positive future
event.
To that end, I believe that construal level plays very well with the overall cognitive load
literature because, at its core, construal level theory is very cognitive in nature. Construal level
theory speaks to the differing ways that psychological distance, or a perception of how close or
far an event or thought is from the individual, impacts outcome behaviors and thoughts (Fujita,
2008; McCrea et al., 2008). Distal construal induces abstract thinking while proximal construal
induces concrete thinking.
Construal level predicts self-control performance (Fujita, 2008; Schmeichel et al., 2010).
Broadly speaking concrete construal has been conceptualized as increasing self-control failure
(Fujita, 2008; Schmeichel et al., 2010). Concrete construal increases the perceived immediacy
and necessity of a to-be-completed task therefore increasing the likelihood that a person becomes
overwhelmed, deciding to not complete the task thereby counting as self-control failure.
Regarding planning for future events, construal level theory has been used to predict
procrastination such that events that are viewed more concretely are less likely to be
procrastinated (McCrea, et al., 2008). Intuitively, when an event is viewed as occurring more
proximally this forces a person to stop procrastinating it and make progress. What this research
does speak to is the powerful nature of construal and furthermore the fact that the concreteness of
construal is a significant predictor even when the difficulty, attractiveness, and importance of the
task were varied (McCrea, et al., 2008). The significant impact of construal level underscores the
behavioral impact of a relatively simple cognitive mechanism and the enduring need to
understand how everyday cognitions impact meaningful behavioral outcomes such as future
planning.

21
Construal level has not only been shown to impact procrastination and starting of tasks,
but, as is pertinent to this paper, construal level is directly tied to executive functioning.
Specifically, concrete construal induced via a mindset manipulation (describing how to complete
a task) has been shown to increase filtering accuracy and working memory capacity relative to an
abstract construal (describing why to complete a task) (Hadar, Luria, & Liberman, 2019). In
other words concrete construal appears to induce greater working memory efficiency. Therefore,
evidence shows that construal level is more than just a change in perceived psychological
distance and instead has significant impacts on cognitive functioning as measured via executive
function. Furthermore, concrete construal is typically thought to be a significant predictor of selfcontrol failure but aids in inhibitory performance in the short term (Fujita, 2008; Schmeichel et
al., 2010). By manipulating the task to be delayed and introducing a goal maintenance (working
memory) component, abstract construal was found to increase relative performance on the
delayed task therefore showing that the construal level and its effects on cognitive load are
dynamic (Schmeichel et al., 2010). Construal level appears to have differential effects on
executive functioning depending on whether the task is immediate or delayed. The primary
conclusion here is that concrete construal is better for immediate tasks and increases working
memory efficiency (Schmeichel et al., 2010). Executive function and its relationship to construal
level is intricate and warrants further study, this paper will look towards the specific outcome of
future planning.
Perceived Time and Planning
Perception of time has a fundamental impact on planning. Anecdotally, perceiving a tobe-completed task as being temporally closer induces greater amount of stress and immediate
need to plan for and complete the task, whereas perceiving a to-be-completed task as temporally
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farther away induces comparatively less stress and a lesser need to immediately plan for and
complete the task. When the present is perceived as shorter, it causes people to be much more
likely to make future-oriented plans (Hershfield & Maglio, 2019). For these reasons, the
relationship between perception of time and planning is pertinent to this paper. Furthermore, as is
directly cogent to this paper, cognitive load has been shown to induce concrete construal that
impacts the perception of time (Huijser et al., 2020; Klaus et al., 2016).
One way in that people tend to systematically bias their decision making regarding future
planning is such that people plan for optimistic scenarios and disregard pessimistic scenarios
(Newby-Clark et al., 2000). The tendency when planning for personal events to disregard
pessimistic scenarios and potential eventualities biases the average person towards shorter or
more optimistic plans and timetables (Newby-Clark et al., 2000). Furthermore, people are
generally overly optimistic in their predictions in their future planning and how long the task will
take (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross,1994).
Further research into the relationship between time perception and planning has
illuminated that people are very poor at judging the total time that a task will take (Forsyth &
Burt, 2008). The task segmentation effect describes people’s tendency to underestimate the time
required to complete a global task relative to estimating the time that each subtask would take
and summing them together (Forsyth & Burt, 2008). In other words, when people are asked to
predict how much time a complex task will take, they tend to underestimate how long it will
take. When people are instead asked to plan for all the individual tasks that make up the complex
task, the summed total is much larger than when participants were asked to plan for the task as a
whole. Segmenting and planning for the individual tasks is also more accurate (Forsyth & Burt,
2008).
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The mechanisms at play as to why people are so poor at judging how long a task will take
and biasing themselves towards optimistic predictions are not well understood. One interesting
finding is that when participants are asked to plan backwards, that is start with the last thing that
will need to be completed and then work towards the first, their estimation of how long the task
will take is significantly longer and more accurate relative to a regular planning condition (Wiese
et al., 2016). Showing that temporally how we think about a task that needs to be completed,
even something so simple as which steps we plan from, has a fundamental impact on planning
efficacy. Planning therefore is behavioral outcome which is easily shifted around, a proof of
concept for the proposed study and the necessity of understanding the mechanism at play.
Overall, how people perceive the passage of time needed to complete tasks has a
substantial impact on effectively planning for the task. Perception of time is impacted by
construal level and construal level ca be induced via cognitive load manipulation (Hadar et al.,
2019; Huijser et al., 2020; Klaus et al., 2016; Schmeichel et al., 2010).
Attractiveness of Task
I believe that the attractiveness or desirability of a to-be-completed task impacts a
person’s intention to engage with the task, assuming there are not other factors which prioritize
the need to plan for a future task. For example, people often look forward to planning for future
vacations or other such leisure activities at the expense of preparing for a work assignment.
Therefore I believe the attractiveness of a task has a non-zero impact on whether people decide
to actually plan for a future event and how much they prioritize it. Regarding the present
proposal, construal level theory posits that distal events are judged on their desirability and
proximal events are judged on their feasibility (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Furthermore, distal
events are primarily conceptualized for their beneficial aspects and as events become more
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proximal the downsides of the event become more salient (Eval et al., 2004). The construal
research supports our tendency to daydream and take time to plan for vacations or other positive
events and why some might therefore choose to devote time to thes positive aspects of distal
events over proximal events. Furthermore, the perceived emotionality of events reduces as a
function of increasing construal level (Boven et al., 2010). If the perceived emotionality of an
event increases as it is more proximal and we view proximal events more concretely and
therefore less positively, then people should prefer to plan for positive future events at the
expense of negative proximal events. But, as a positive future event (such as vacation planning)
becomes more proximal as a product of time or cognitive load a person might be more likely to
avoid engaging in the planning process because there are no extrinsic motivators that often exist
with negatively valanced work tasks that we must complete.
How Cognitive Load and Construal Interact
Concretely, the present study proposal is a novel contribution to the literature because it
explores the alternative explanations of cognitive load and construal level theory on the outcome
of future planning. Under cognitive load planning is thought to be hindered (Ferrari, 2001;
Huijser et al., 2020). In contrast, as concrete construal increases beneficial outcomes of planning
behavior also increase. Why this is interesting is because cognitive load has been shown to
induce concrete construal; therefore, the two constructs appear to interact with one another but
seemingly lead to opposing planning outcomes. The present proposal will seek to test whether
cognitive load or construal level theory will be the primary driving force behind planning
behavior, as this has not been tested sufficiently up until this point. The outcome of the research
could side completely with one theory or be more nuanced where increasing levels of cognitive
load will have negative impacts on planning behavior, but that a “goldilocks” zone of cognitive

25
load may exist where it confers the benefit of inducing concrete construal without exceeding a
threshold of cognitive load that overall hinders cognitive functions (e.g. planning).
Understanding whether cognitive load or construal level theory drive the expected results in the
proposed study will provide a novel contribution and will elucidate how the average person’s
cognition works under concurrent cognitive load. If the predictions of construal theory on
planning win out over those of cognitive load theory then this supposes that cognitive load does
not necessarily hinder our ability to plan, and that instead our cognition simply changes to
manage the current load in an efficient way. On the other hand, if cognitive load significantly
hinders planning behavior and washes out any benefits conferred by inducing concrete construal
then this supposes that cognitive load needs to be managed or considered because it clearly has
significant downstream consequences on outcomes of cognition. Several different outcomes can
be rationalized based on the literature. My present proposal will include not only my own
personal predictions based on the read of the literature, but also predictions that are driven by
each theory.
Study Rationale: Cognitive Load and Construal Level on Planning
A common theme throughout the literature on planning is that how one perceives their
time, namely looking towards the future or in the past, has an impact on how much time people
think a task will/has taken and the impacts that those judgements have on planning. These
findings have striking resemblance to construal level theory. Construal level theory is also
conceptualized as the way one perceives time in relationship to themselves and the impacts on
downstream behaviors and thoughts. Because both theories of cognitive load and construal level
discuss the passage of time, one might expect that they lead to similar predictions on outcome
variables like planning. The primary purpose of this paper and conducted research is to analyze
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the relationship between these two constructs because they do not predict the same outcomes on
planning. It is therefore worth researching and uncovering why this might be the case and how
these two theories overlap but also contrast with another on an ecologically relevant outcome
variable of planning.
Cognitive load literature on planning is sparse but primarily suggests a hinderance or
reduced ability to properly plan for a task when under cognitive load (Ferrari, 2001; Huijser et
al., 2020), such that fewer steps will be generated, or the planning efficacy will be reduced.
Construal level theory on the other hand has much more nuanced findings and predictions such
that under a concrete construal people generate significantly more steps or items to be completed
for a planning task. These two findings are at odds with one another because concrete construal
is suggested to be induced via cognitive load. If this were the case then one would expect that
under cognitive load a person will view a prospective event that must be planned for concretely,
leading to a greater number of steps being generated. Parsing apart these findings will be a
considerable contribution to the literature and will help to elucidate the relationship between
cognitive load and construal level theory on the outcome of planning.
One suggestion worth considering is that the amount of cognitive load necessary to
induce a concrete construal is relatively low. As such there may be a goldilocks zone of
cognitive load that confers the benefits of concrete construal while not conferring the negative
impacts of higher cognitive load. A goldilocks zone of cognitive load is analogous to the
beneficial moderate level of stress, which aids in finishing an assignment, whereas lower stress
might cause a person to not start the task and higher stress will prevent a person from focusing
and completing the task.
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The research study tested the effects of concurrent working memory load on planning
towards both a negative (preparing for a work presentation) and positive (preparing for a
vacation) event, while subsequently assessing the specificity with which participants plan for
these events as well as their enthusiasm towards them. Concurrent working memory load was
induced via a modified updating task (Miyake et al., 2000; Yntema, 1963) whereby participants
were asked to maintain the last exemplar from a particular category throughout the study, these
categories were constantly updated with new exemplars. Cognitive load level was manipulated
by how many pairs back participants must maintain: high load = 5 categories, low load = 2
categories, no load = 0 categories. This updating task is similar to a N-back task insofar as it
requires participants to remember a set number of items that were previously presented but
differs such that all possible words which participants see will be presented on the front end to
allow for participants to familiarize themselves with the words and prevent any individual
differences as a product of prior experience. The updating task ran concurrently with a planning
task whereby participants were asked to list out the steps that must be completed ahead of an
event three weeks in the future, either: 1) a presentation to your supervisor 2) a vacation to a
location which requires travel from your current location. Lastly, participants were assessed on
outcome variables of the number of steps they generate for the task they are planning for as well
as their enthusiasm towards the task.
Predicted Results by Theory
I predicted that there will be a main effect of cognitive load on the planning task such that
significantly more steps will be generated in the moderate load condition, because it will induce
a concrete construal which has been shown to benefit planning. On the other hand, the high load
condition will not confer the benefits of concrete construal do to an over-taxing of the working
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memory system thereby hindering processing capacity. I further predicted an interaction of
cognitive load and task type such that enthusiasm towards the work task will hold steady or
increase under high cognitive load, but enthusiasm for the vacation task will decrease under high
cognitive load.
I predicted that the amount of time predicted to complete both individual tasks and the
total sum of all tasks required to complete a task will decrease as a function of cognitive load,
such that the high cognitive load condition will display significantly shorter predictions of task
time. Lastly, cognitive load will increase to intention to participate for the work task but decrease
intention to participate for the vacation planning task.
My predicted hypotheses:
1: Moderate cognitive load (2 to-be-remembered categories) will induce a concrete construal that
will increase the steps generated on the planning tasks relative to no cognitive load condition and
high cognitive load (5 to-be-remembered categories). Moderate cognitive load will induce
concrete construal without overloading the working memory system to the extent that detriments
are observed. High cognitive load will utilize so many cognitive resources that no benefits will
be observed in planning if anything detriments in planning will be observed. Lastly, no load will
have no impact on planning, namely no increase in planning efficacy as a product of concrete
construal.
2: Cognitive load will impact enthusiasm towards the task such that in the work task condition
enthusiasm towards the task will increase or stay the same but enthusiasm towards the vacation
task will decrease under cognitive load, the greatest difference observed in high cognitive load.
The decrease in enthusiasm towards the vacation task is predicted to a function of induced
concrete construal through concurrent working memory load. Concrete construal predicts higher
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emotionality, primarily negative and focuses on the perceived feasibility of a task rather than its
attractiveness.
3: Predicted completion time for individual tasks as well as the sum will decrease as a function
of cognitive load, with high cognitive load having the lowest predicted completion time.
Cognitive load theory hypotheses:
1b: Moderate cognitive load (2-to-be-remembered categories) and high cognitive load (5 to-beremembered categories) will both decrease steps generated on either planning task relative to the
no cognitive load condition.
2b: Both high and moderate cognitive load will impact enthusiasm towards the planning task.
High cognitive load will cause the greatest reduction in enthusiasm relative to no load, with
moderate cognitive load leading to a moderate if perhaps unsignificant reduction in enthusiasm.
3b: Predicted completion time for individual tasks as well as the sum will decrease as a function
of cognitive load.
Construal level theory hypotheses:
1c: Moderate cognitive load (2 to-be-remembered categories) and high cognitive load (5 to-beremembered categories) will induce a concrete construal leading to more steps being generated
on the planning tasks relative to the no load condition.
2c: Cognitive load will impact enthusiasm towards the task such that in the work task condition
enthusiasm towards the task will increase or stay the same but enthusiasm towards the vacation
task will decrease under cognitive load, the greatest effect should be observed under high load.
The decrease in enthusiasm towards the vacation task is predicted to a function of induced
concrete construal through concurrent working memory load. Concrete construal predicts higher
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emotionality, primarily negative and focuses on the perceived feasibility of a task rather than its
attractiveness.
3c: Both high and moderate cognitive load will induce a concrete construal, reducing expected
completion times individually and in sum.
Method
Participants
Participants for this study were 693 participants sampled through an online sampling
platform called Prolific. The sample identified as: 339 female, 273 male, 11 non-binary, and 3
non-specific. The sample indicated the following ethnicity breakdown: 495 White (37 identified
as Hispanic/LatinX), 58 Asian, 47 Black, 3 Alaskan native/ Native American, and 24 selected
other. The sample had a mean age of 38 (SD = 13.92).
Instrument
This study was conducted with a single online session administered through Qualtrics.
Participants were recruited through prolific. The study took an average of 12 minutes and
participants were compensated at a rate of 10 USD/hr. Participants were first asked to read and
sign an informed consent. Participants were then randomly assigned in accordance with a 3
(Cognitive load: No load, Low, High) X 2 (Planning: Vacation, Work) design, such that four
conditions existed: low load/vacation planning, low load/work planning, high load/vacation
planning, and high load/work planning.
The participants were first familiarized with the updating cognitive load task (Wilhelm et
al., 2013; Yntema, 1963)(See Figure 1 & 2). During this initial familiarization and practice
period participants were presented with all possible exemplars from six possible categories
(relatives, distances, metals, animals, colors, countries) and told that these categories and the
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exemplars within are all the possible words that they will be asked to remember throughout the
study. Then pairs of categories and exemplars were serially presented for 1500ms each. The task
was to remember the last word presented in each of the target categories.
For example, if given the words (Dog, Sophia) and then prompted to recall the last
exemplar from the animal category, a participant would answer: Dog. These to-be-remembered
exemplars were constantly updated and the amount of categories which participants were asked
to update functioned as the method of manipulating cognitive load level. This same updating task
ran concurrently throughout the study: high load participants were asked to remember the last
exemplar encountered from 5 categories and low load participants were asked to remember the
last exemplar encountered from 2 categories. The exemplars from each category to be
remembered as well as prompts asking participants what the last exemplar from a particular
category they encountered was were interspersed throughout the planning task.
The planning task, which occurred after the familiarization period with the updating
cognitive load task, asked participants to plan for either a hypothetical presentation they have
been asked to create for work or a hypothetical vacation they are taking from work. Participants
were told either “your supervisor has asked you to give a presentation on all the work you have
done in the past sixth months. You have three weeks to prepare for this presentation. What are all
the steps needed to complete this task?” or “Your supervisor has granted your vacation request.
You have three weeks to prepare for this vacation out of town. What are all the steps needed to
complete these task?” Participants were given a table whereby they listed out all possible steps
necessary to plan for the given task they were assigned to plan for. Participants were instructed
that these steps need not be in chronological order, simply listing all possible steps they think
would be needed to sufficiently plan for the task.
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Participants were then given a Likert scale assessing their general enthusiasm towards the
task they were asked to complete (work / vacation planning): not at all enthused (1), (2), (3), (4),
very much so enthused (5). Participants were then asked to estimate the total time required to
complete the task as well as an estimate of how long each step will take individually. These
participant generated steps were piped back to the participant so they can see what they wrote,
subsequently being asked how long each step will take. Then participants will completed Likert
type scale measures of enthusiasm towards each step: not at all enthused (1), (2), (3), (4), very
much so enthused (5). Finally, demographics were assessed.
Exclusion Criteria
Seven-hundred and forty-seven responses were collected on Qualtrics. Eighty-two
participants were immediately excluded from further consideration for not completing the
survey, as noted by Qualtrics. Sixty-five participants were further excluded if they did not
engage with the cognitive load manipulation correctly and via a questionnaire at the end of the
study assessing their: attention, effort, and honesty throughout the study (See Figure 3) as well as
participants who did not engage with other aspects of the study. Each item in this questionnaire
is presented on a Likert scale and if participants score poorly on this brief assessment their data
will be excluded. The questionnaire includes items such as, “I paid extremely close attention”:
not at all (1), (2), (3), (4), very much so (5). Twenty-two participants were removed because they
scored below the mid-point of the effort assessment (14). A final twenty-four participants were
excluded for not completing the effort questionnaire, or other aspects of the study that were
required. Furthermore, participant responses on the planning task were qualitatively assessed. If
there was significant evidence that a participant did not put forward responses in good faith, then
participant response was excluded. Nineteen participants were removed for not properly
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engaging with the load manipulation. Lastly, participants needed to demonstrate an ability to
understand and properly complete the example of the cognitive load manipulation. Whether or
not they did well on the cognitive load manipulation during the test is irrelevant, but participants
must demonstrate an understanding and willingness to engage with this manipulation.
Results
Analyses conducted were a 3 (Cognitive load: No load, Low, High) X 2 (Planning:
Vacation, Work) ANOVA assessing the impact of cognitive load level and planning task
condition on outcome variables: number of planning steps generated, estimated time to complete
task: total & first two steps respectively, and enthusiasm. Interactions were assessed via Tukey
HSD pairwise comparisons. Individual dependent variables are presented below.
Dependent Variable: Planning Steps Generated
The hypothesized results are as follows. Moderate cognitive load (2 to-be-remembered
categories) will induce a concrete construal that will increase the steps generated on the planning
tasks relative to the no cognitive load condition and high cognitive load (5 to-be-remembered
categories). Moderate cognitive load will induce concrete construal without overloading the
working memory system to the extent that detriments are observed. High cognitive load will
utilize so many cognitive resources that no benefits will be observed in planning if anything
detriments in planning will be observed. Lastly, no load will have no impact on planning, namely
no increase in planning efficacy as a product of concrete construal.
A main effect of cognitive load on steps generated was observed, F (2,622) = 5.34, p
<.01, η2 = .02. The specifics of the analysis are presented in (Table 1, Figure 4). The main effect
of cognitive load was further qualified by post hoc Tukey’s HSD comparisons showing that there
was a significant difference between the high load (M = 5.09, SE = .17) and no load (M = 5.84,
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SE = .16) such that significantly more steps were generated in no load. There was no significant
difference between the high and low load or low and no load.
A main effect of task was observed, F (1,622) = 41.77, p <.01, η2 = .06. The main effect
is qualified such that the participants in the vacation task (M = 6.04, SE = .14) had significantly
more steps generated than the work task (M = 4.81, SE = .14).
The interaction of load and task was not significant, F (2,622) = .63, p =.59, η2 < .00. The
predicted results on planning steps generated were not observed. Results and implications will be
further discussed.
Dependent Variable: Estimated Time to Complete Task
The hypothesized results are as follows. Predicted completion time for individual tasks as
well as the sum will decrease as a function of cognitive load, with high cognitive load having the
lowest predicted completion time.
The main effect of load on estimated time was not significant, F (2,622) = 2.64, p =.12,
η2 < .00. The high load condition (M = 551.02, SE = 313.01) was not significantly different from
the low load condition (M = 1333.15, SE = 301.81) and no load condition (M = 1049.61, SE =
306.28). The main effect of task was not significant, F (1,622) = 1.10, p =.30, η2 < .00. The
vacation task (M = 791.43, SE = 250.70) was not significantly different from the work task (M =
1164.43, SE = 252.35). Furthermore, the interaction was not significant, F (2,622) = .70, p =.49,
η2 < .00. Adding in the number of steps generated as a covariate did not change the observed
results, with all p’s greater than .18 and not significant.
Further independent ANOVA analyses were run on the estimated time that participants
predicted for their first and second planned step. For the first planned step the main effect of task
on estimated time not significant, F (1,622) = 2.91, p =.08, η2 < .00. The main effect of load on
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estimated time was not significant, F (2,622) = .28, p =.76, η2 < .00. Lastly, the interaction of
task and load was not significant for the first planned step, F (2,622) = .09, p =.91, η2 < .00. For
the second planned step the main effect of task was not significant, F (1,622) = .69, p =.41, η2 <
.00. The main effect of load was not significant, F (2,622) = .13, p =.88, η2 < .00. Lastly, the
interaction of load and task was not significant for the second planned step, F (2,622) = 1.69, p
=.19, η2 < .00.
Overall, none of the expected results were found. The results of the current study reveal
no significant differences in estimated time for planned tasks across task type, cognitive load
manipulation level, and the interaction of the two. Results and implications will be further
discussed.
Dependent Variable: Enthusiasm
The hypothesized results are as follows. Cognitive load will impact enthusiasm towards
the task such that in the work task condition enthusiasm towards the task will increase or stay the
same but enthusiasm towards the vacation task will decrease under cognitive load, the greatest
difference observed in high cognitive load. The decrease in enthusiasm towards the vacation task
is predicted to a function of induced concrete construal through concurrent working memory
load. Concrete construal predicts higher emotionality, primarily negative and focuses on the
perceived feasibility of a task rather than its attractiveness.
A main effect of cognitive load on enthusiasm was observed, F (2,622) = 4.13, p =.02, η2
= .01. The differences observed in the main effect of cognitive load are qualified by a Tukey’s
HSD comparison revealing that high load (M = 16.63, SE = .67) and no load (M = 18.87, SE =
.66) were significantly different; furthermore, low load (M = 16.46, SE = .65) and no load (M =
18.87, SE = .66) were significantly different. Adding in number of steps generated as a covariate
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in the analysis reduced the size of the main effect below the level of significance, F (2,622) =
1.82, p =.16, η2 = .00. A main effect of task type on enthusiasm was also observed, F (1,622) =
58.49, p <.01, η2 = .09. The main effect of task type is such that the vacation task (M = 10.25, SE
= .54) was rated significantly higher than the work task (M = 14.40, SE = .54). The interaction of
load and task was not significant, F (2,622) = .19, p =.82, η2 < .00. The specifics of the analysis
are presented in (Table 2, Figure 5).
Overall, none of the hypothesized results were found. As with the previous dependent
variables the hypothesized interactions were not observed. The implications of all these findings
will be discussed.
Dependent Variable: Mood
Overall mood was also assessed after participants had completed the planning task. This
analysis was exploratory; therefore, no predictions are stated. Results revealed a significant main
effect of cognitive load on mood, F (2,622) = 16.94, p < .01, η2 = .05. The main effect of
cognitive load was qualified by Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests which show that the high load
condition (M = 50.95, SE = 1.72) was significantly lower relative to the low load (M = 60.29, SE
= 1.67) and no load (M = 64.71, SE = 1.69) conditions on overall mood. There was no significant
difference between low cognitive load and no load.
A main effect of task type on mood was also observed, F (1,622) = 15.00, p < .01, η2 <
.02. Participants had significantly higher mood when planning for the vacation task (M = 62.44,
SE = 1.38) relative to the work task (M = 54.87, SE = 1.39). An interaction of cognitive load and
task type was not observed, F (2,622) = 1.13, p =.32, η2 < .00.
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Dependent Variable: Experience with the Task
Experience with the assigned planning task was assessed. This analysis was exploratory;
therefore, no predictions are stated. A main effect of load was observed, F (2,622) = 12.79, p <
.01, η2 < .04. Tukey’s HSD post hoc analyses reveal a significant difference such that high load
(M = 2.81, SE = .08) was significantly lower than no load (M = 3.30, SE = .08) and low load (M
= 2.82, SE = .08) was significantly lower than no load.
A main effect of task type was observed, F (1,622) = 53.18, p < .01, η2 < .08. Such that
participants had significantly more experience planning for the vacation task (M = 3.31, SE =
.06) compared to the work task (M = 2.65, SE = .07). The interaction of cognitive load and task
type was not significant, F (2,622) = .51, p =.59, η2 < .00.
Dependent Variable: Task Prioritization
Participants were further assessed on whether they prioritized the cognitive load or
planning task. This analysis was exploratory; therefore, no predictions are stated. Higher scores
on the Likert scale measure indicating prioritization of the cognitive load task. A main effect of
load on prioritization was not observed, F (1,412) = .13, p =.72, η2 < .00. There was no
significant difference between the high (M = 3.38, SE = .07) and low load (M = 3.35, SE = .06)
conditions in which task they prioritized.
A main effect of task on prioritization was not observed, F (1,412) = 1.94, p =.17, η2 <
.00. There was no significant difference between the vacation planning (M = 3.30, SE = .06) and
work planning (M = 3.30, SE = .06) tasks in which task they prioritized. Lastly, the interaction of
load and task was not significant, F (1,412) = .25, p =..62, η2 < .00.
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Discussion
Overall, while main effects of cognitive load and task type were observed for planning steps
generated and enthusiasm towards planned steps, the predicted interactions of cognitive load and
task type on enthusiasm were not observed. Furthermore, the predicted results of cognitive load
on planning efficacy were not observed. The specifics of these findings will be discussed,
including the rationale for why the predicted findings may not have been observed. Future
directions and limitations will also be discussed.
Planning Steps Generated
Planning steps generated was the dependent variable which encapsulated the detail and
efficacy with which participants planned. The more steps that are generated the better
downstream outcomes are observed, namely the task being completed (Ferrari, 2001; Klaus et
al., 2016). In this research study I hypothesized that the cognitive load task would result in the
greatest number of steps being generated in the moderate cognitive load condition relative to the
high load and no load conditions, regardless of what task the participants were asked to plan for.
The rationale for this hypothesis was that moderate cognitive load would induce a concrete
construal which would fundamentally change participants perceptions of the event that they were
planning for (Huijser et al., 2020). Inducing a concrete construal via moderate cognitive load was
theorized increase the specificity with which participants thought about the event they were
planning for as well as truncating the amount of time they felt that they had to plan for it (Huijser
et al., 2020). Unfortunately, the relationship between cognitive load and planning efficacy did
not yield the hypothesized results. Overall, the findings support the cognitive load literature that
suggests as cognitive load increases planning efficacy decreases (Ferrari, 2001).
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The cognitive load literature was supported by the results found in this study with a main
effect of cognitive load on planning steps generated (Klaus et al, 2016). Participants produced
significantly more planned steps for both the work and vacation tasks when they were under no
concurrent cognitive load, with the fewest steps being generated under high concurrent cognitive
load. The observed results mirror what the limited cognitive load literature on planning efficacy
has found to this point, as cognitive load increases fewer working memory resources are
available with which to properly consider all the necessary steps that might be required to
complete a task (Klaus et al., 2016). As working memory becomes taxed this has downstream
impacts on a variety of cognitive functions and in the context of this study it hinders participants
planning capabilities.
The importance of finding that cognitive load hinders planning efficacy is that it builds
upon the existing literature and demonstrates how reliably cognitive load can be induced leading
to considerable downstream impacts (Huijser et al., 2020). If cognitive load can be quickly
induced via the induction used in this study then it is reasonable to assume that cognitive load
can also be reliably induced via a multitude of real world situations. Knowing that cognitive load
negatively impacts planning behavior implies that for the most effective planning a person
should be put in a situation where they can focus on the planning task at hand. Freeing up
cognitive resources from other work tasks as well as other external factors which might induce
cognitive load.
A further finding elucidated by this study was that task type had a significant main effect
on planning steps generated. The findings are not particularly surprising, that the vacation
planning task had significantly more steps than the work planning task. Participants were more
detailed in their planning for an objectively positive future event relative to a work presentation

40
which is objectively less attractive. The main takeaway from this finding is that people are more
likely to engage with planning for a positive future event. The applications of this finding are
that employers could try to make work tasks more appealing and fulfilling for employees.
Anecdotally, many people are extremely unhappy with their work and dread having to do it. The
findings of my study suggest that if people looked forward to work they would plan more
effectively.
Lastly, the main intention of my research study was to show differential outcomes of
cognitive load on planning outcomes. What I expected to see was that moderate cognitive load
would induce a concrete (proximal) construal that in turn would increase participants planning
efficacy relative to high cognitive load or no load inductions (Hadar et al, 2019). The
hypothesized result was not observed. The cognitive load induction utilized in my study did not
have differential effects on planning efficacy at moderate cognitive load, suggesting that a
concrete construal was not induced. Another interpretation of the results could be that even if a
concrete construal was induced that it did not outcompete the effects observed by cognitive load.
Either way, the predicted results confirm the cognitive load literature (Block et al., 2010). My
hypothesis that a concrete construal could be induced via cognitive load leading to beneficial
outcomes on planning was not confirmed, thereby suggesting that as my study is concerned that
cognitive load did not have intended beneficial effects.
Alternative explanations for the observed findings center on the planning task itself and if
the number of steps planned is an effective measure construal level. Furthermore, if generating
fewer planned steps may paradoxically be a representation of a concrete construal. Addressing
the first possibility, it may be the case that the number of steps generated on a planning task is
not a particularly effective measure of construal level. The observed results could be caused by a
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variety of factors including the affective spillover of the cognitive load task. The concurrent
cognitive load task was difficult and not enjoyable, because of this the participants that were in
the cognitive load conditions may have not sufficiently engaged with the planning task.
Furthermore, while the planning task was intended to be as ecologically valid as possible there
are considerable individual differences in people’s propensity to make detailed plans. It is
possible that a larger than expected subset of participants were not comfortable with making
plans as they were instructed. Having said that, I still observed a reduction in planned steps as
cognitive load increased so even if participants were generally uncomfortable with the planning
task a main effect of cognitive load was still observed.
Addressing the second possibility, it could be the case that for the planning task utilized
in this study that fewer steps generated demonstrates a more concrete construal thereby
confirming my hypotheses. Interpreting fewer steps generated as a concrete construal would be
at odds with the literature, but one could conceptualize that cognitive load generating fewer steps
is participants thinking of the planned for event in a way that can be achieved. Consolidating
necessary steps into clusters because they are viewing the upcoming event more proximally and
therefore planning fewer steps that can be acted upon and completed. Unfortunately, I don’t have
any way of confirming nor disconfirming this conceptualization, especially because it is at odds
with the literature. Future research would need to determine whether fewer steps generated on a
planning task like what was utilized in this study might represent a concrete construal.
Estimated Time to Complete Task
In this study it was hypothesized that estimated time to complete the task would decrease
as a function of cognitive load. No effects of cognitive load, task type, or the interaction were
observed in this study. The fact that no effects were observed makes any conclusions or
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interpretations difficult. Primarily the expected effects of cognitive load on estimated time to
complete the task may be a representation of the cognitive load manipulation not being
significant enough, although this is not a likely scenario. The cognitive load manipulation was
quite difficult. Therefore, it may also be the case that lack of psychological realism of the study
influenced participants to not properly consider how long the planning would take. It could be
the case that because the participants were not extremely motivated to plan as they would be in
real life, and therefore the lack of effect was observed in this study.
Enthusiasm
Finally, an interaction of cognitive load and task type was hypothesized such that
enthusiasm towards the task would decrease as a function of cognitive load in the vacation
planning task but not in the work planning task. The rationale for this hypothesis was that
cognitively loading an individual makes them think more concretely and that increases the
specificity of how an event is viewed (Klaus et al., 2016). In relation to planning for a vacation I
predicted that as participants think about the specifics of planning for the event that they would
feel more negatively about it, because they are not able to consider the more abstract or global
thoughts that would be more positively valanced. These results were not observed, but main
effects of cognitive load and task type were observed.
First and foremost a main effect of cognitive load was observed such that the high and
moderate cognitive load conditions both had significantly less enthusiasm compared to the no
load condition. This is contrary to the predictions that I made, but interestingly the means of both
cognitive load conditions were very similar to one another. The means being extremely similar in
both cognitive load conditions suggests that the manipulation had a similar effect regardless of
the amount of cognitive load induced. Therefore, it appears as if there was a significant negative
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impact or affective spillover of the cognitive load manipulation (Hooff & Hooft, 2016). It is
worth noting that when total steps planned was included as a covariate the main effect of
cognitive load was no longer significant, suggest that enthusiasm per step was the same across
levels of cognitive load. Overall mood was still impacted even if the main effect of load on
enthusiasm was nullified by including the variance associated with total steps generated.
Participants more than likely were so unenthused with the load task that they felt wholly negative
about the other aspects of the study that they were asked to do. The overall mood measure
presented in this study confirms suggestions of affective spillover. Participants who were placed
in the high cognitive load condition were significantly lower in mood relative to the other
conditions, particularly the no load condition, suggesting that the cognitive load task caused
participants negative affect which can have impacts on perceptions of other aspects of the study
(Hooff & Hooft, 2016). In the future, it is worth considering how negatively the concurrent load
task made participants feel and a different task may need to be utilized if enthusiasm is an
outcome variable of interest. It could also be possible that cognitive load broadly negatively
impacts people’s affective state, therefore decreasing enthusiasm regardless of the type of
cognitive load induction utilized. Future research could compare differing cognitive load
manipulations to see if there are differential impacts on enthusiasm for a planning (or other) task
depending on the type of load induction.
The main effect of task type was relatively straightforward such that participants rated the
vacation planning task with significantly more enthusiasm relative to the work planning task. I
think the observed findings map onto typical anecdotal experience. Even those who enjoy the
work that they do on average will have more enthusiasm planning for vacation, if for no other
reason than the novelty of it. Planning for a work presentation is something that you can be
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evaluated on, requires a considerable amount of work, and is the summation of work that you
one has done over a long period of time. Planning for vacation is something that one can usually
only do one or two times a year and therefore produces significantly more enthusiasm.
Overall Take Aways
Broadly the results of this study show that cognitive load reduces planning efficacy and
enthusiasm. Furthermore, the type of task that people plan for further impacts their planning
efficacy and enthusiasm such that people are significantly better and more enthusiastic about
planning for positively valanced events like a vacation than a systematic work review. Clearly
cognitive load is a construct that needs to be considered in all facets of life. Truncating one’s
available cognitive resources has immediate impacts on cognition; therefore, employers and
people should consider how cognitively loaded they or their employees are when it comes to
assessing their performance, making plans, or attempting any of a variety of tasks. Cognitive
load has been shown to have significant downstream impacts and the present study only confirms
the importance of this construct (Allen et al, 2014; Wolfe et al., 2019). The broad implications of
my findings are that all facets of our day-to-day life need to consider how cognitive load is
currently affecting people. By considering how cognitively loaded people are and creating
strategies to supplement their cognition if they are cognitively loaded, or finding ways to reduce
cognitive load, this will lead to appreciable benefits in any domain.
Limitations and Future Directions
One of the primary limitations of the present study was the lack of psychological realism.
Asking participants to plan for a work presentation or vacation is ecologically valid, but the way
they were asked to do so all at once in the context of a Qualtrics survey was relatively different
from how that would play out naturally. There are individual differences in participants
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likelihood to even plan in a detailed manner as well but all participants were asked to plan,
therefore some of them may have found the task to be quite difficult. The concurrent load task
was also low in psychological realism. In my opinion it is a significant issue with most cognitive
load inductions in that asking participants to hold information in the forefront of their mind is
similar to how cognitive load would manifest in day-to-day life but the content of what
participants are being asked to keep in the forefront is not. People on average will be cognitively
loaded by ruminative thoughts, chores that they need to do when they get home, upcoming work
tasks, etc. In this study and others though it is necessary that participants are uniformly loaded,
for internal validity, the consequence of this is a reduction in psychological realism. The relative
lack of realism in the planning task and the cognitive load induction could have impacts on how
seriously participants took the study and their subsequent outcome variables. In the future it
would be beneficial to find a way to get participants to plan for something that is upcoming in
their life, while I manipulate their cognitive load by having them think about things that are
relevant to their own life. Differing results from what were observed in this study might be
found.
A further limitation of my study was I was unable to qualitatively assess the planning
steps that participants generated. Being able to assess the relative concreteness and abstractness
of participants specific steps that they generated may have informed the conclusions that could
be drawn. Unfortunately, timing and resources were not in our favor and the qualitative
assessment of the responses was reasonable. It is a possibility that if the responses were
qualitatively coded that a difference in construal may be observed, thereby confirming my
hypotheses.
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Another limitation of this study, which has been discussed throughout this section
already, was the apparent difficulty and negatively valanced affective spillover of the cognitive
load manipulation. The results of the study seem to suggest that the cognitive load manipulation
was very difficult, thereby potentially loading participants working memory capacity too
severely making the moderate cognitive load condition more severe than it was intended.
Furthermore, the lack of effects seen on enthusiasm, and the fact that both the moderate and high
cognitive load conditions had extremely similar enthusiasm suggests that the cognitive load
manipulation was poorly received by participants. By having to do the cognitive load task
participants may not have enjoyed or properly engaged with the other aspects of the study. A
more appealing and less difficult cognitive load manipulation may show differential effects
compared to those that were observed.
Future directions that should be pursued are increasing the ecological validity of the
planning task and cognitive load induction. Furthermore, making the cognitive load induction
less difficult or including an even lower loaded condition compared to what was utilized in the
present study. I believe that under the correct circumstances cognitive load may have beneficial
outcomes, but the present study was not able to confirm these suspicions. My primary
assumption is that the moderate cognitive load condition was still too cognitively taxing and if it
were easier for participants to attend to, and if the task itself was more compelling, differing
results may have been observed. Future research could elucidate these findings. The results
obtained by the present study can still be useful. Primarily, understanding that cognitive load
negatively impacts enthusiasm and planning efficacy qualifies the relative downsides of
multitasking or having to perform cognitively taxing cognitions while simultaneously performing
another task. Employers and individuals alike can try to insure that if they want to properly plan
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for a future even that they need to devote as much of their available cognitive resources to the
planning task as possible.
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Tables
Table 1
ANOVA Results – Total Steps Generated
Predictor
df
MS
F
Load
2
30.40
5.34
Task
1
237.97
41.77
Load X Task
2
3.00
.53
Note. Total steps generated for planning task. ** p <.001 *p < .005

p
.00*
.00**
.59

2
.02
.06
.00

p
.19
.29
.49

2
.00
.00
.00

F

p

2

.28
2.91
.09

.76
.09
.92

8.95e-7
.00
2.89e-4

5.34
.69
1.69

.88
.41
.19

4.41e-4
.00
.00

p
.02
.00**
.82

2
.01
.09
5.71e-4

Table 2
ANOVA Results – Total Time Predicted
Predictor
df
MS
F
Load
2
3.24e7
1.63
Task
1
2.17e7
1.10
Load X Task
2
1.39e7
.70
Note. Total time predicted to complete planning task.

Table 3
ANOVA Results – Total Steps Generated
Predictor
df
MS
Step 1
Load
2
9.98e6
Task
1
1.05e7
Load X Task
2
3.22e6
Step 2
Load
2
3.54e5
Task
1
1.82e6
Load X Task
2
4.49e6
Note. Time predicted for first and second step.

Table 4
ANOVA Results – Total Enthusiasm
Predictor
df
MS
F
Load
2
378.58
4.13
Task
1
5366.49
58.49
Load X Task
2
18.05
.19
Note. Total time predicted to complete planning task. ** p <.001
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Figures

Figure 1. Categories and exemplar list
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Figure 2. Example of updating task. Participants will be presented with categories, exemplars,
and box to recall the last exemplar seen.
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•

1

I paid extremely close attention.

2
(Not at all)
•

3

4

5
(Very much so)

I completed this study as fast as I could.

1

2

3

4

5

(Not at all)
•

1

(Very much so)

I am certain this is the first time I have done this survey.

2
(Not at all)
•

3

4

5
(Very much so)

My responses to this survey were real and honest.

1

2

3

4

5

(Not at all)
•

(Very much so)

You should not use my responses on this survey because I did not take it seriously.

1

2
(Not at all)

3

4

5
(Very much so)

Figure 3. Example ending questionnaire on effort. Used for exclusion purposes.
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Figure 4. Cognitive load and task type on total steps generated.

60

Figure 5. Cognitive load and task type on total enthusiasm.

61

Your supervisor has asked you to give a presentation on all the work you have done in the
past six months. You have three weeks to prepare for this presentation. What are all the
steps necessary to complete this task?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Figure 6. Example planning task.
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-

What is your overall enthusiasm towards the work planning task?

1
(Not at all)

2

3
(Indifferent)

4

5
(Very much so)

-

How much total time will it take you to plan for the work planning task?

-

How much time will it take for the first step (pipe in response) you noted for your planning task?

-

How much time will it take for the next step (pipe in response) you noted for your planning task?

-

What is your enthusiasm towards the first step you indicated (pipe in) in the planning task?

1
(Not at all)
-

2

3
(Indifferent)

4

5
(Very much so)

What is your enthusiasm towards the next step you indicated (pipe in) in the planning task?

1
(Not at all)

2

3
(Indifferent)

4

5
(Very much so)

Figure 7. Example general and specific measure of time / enthusiasm for the work planning
task.
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Appendix

Figure 8. IRB approval letter.

